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Abstract 
This paper discusses Islamic monetary policy which could potentially be a sustainable 
alternative to the conventional. Islamic banks and financial institutions have to set their 
benchmark based on London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) which raises doubt and 
controversy of the uniqueness of Islamic finance. By analyzing current literature on Islamic 
monetary policy models it is proposed in this study that GDP growth rate adjusted for interest 
income and inflation can be set as a benchmark for money market instrument and reference rate 
for financial and capital market to set the cost of capital or rate of return. In order to test the two 
proposed models, one year data from 99 countries have been collected. The study uses the OLS 
regression and the result shows that real interest rate is not a viable instrument for monetary 
policy framework as no significant relationship has been found with key factors such as inflation 
and unemployment. On the other hand, GDP growth rate has a statistically significant 
relationship with inflation and unemployment, GDP growth rate is higher for OIC countries, 
however, unemployment rate is higher.  
 
Key words: Monetary Policy, Islamic Monetary Policy, Real Interest Rate, GDP Growth Rate, 
Inflation, Real Exchange Rate, Gross Savings 
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Introduction 
 
Monetary policy is a mechanism to control the money supply and demand by 
manipulating interest rate in conventional economic system while in Islamic economic system 
Riba i.e. interest rate is prohibited, an alternative system, method or instrument is necessary 
which can truly control the supply and demand of money in the economy in order to maintain a 
stable local currency, sustainable growth, higher income, higher savings, lower and stable 
inflation and lower unemployment. 
 
Monetary policy is generally mentioned to as either being expansionary or 
contractionary, where an expansionary policy increases the total supply of money in the 
economy more rapidly than usual, and contractionary policy expands the money supply more 
slowly than usual or even shrinks it. Expansionary policy is traditionally used to try to combat 
unemployment in a recession by lowering interest rates in the hope that easy credit will entice 
businesses into expanding. Contractionary policy is intended to slow inflation in order to avoid 
the resulting distortions and deterioration of asset values. 
 
Conventional monetary policy literatures state that monetary policy, to a great extent, is 
the management of expectations (Svensson, 2004). Monetary policy rests on the relationship 
between the rates of interest in an economy, that is, the price at which money can be borrowed, 
and the total supply of money. Monetary policy uses a variety of tools to control one or both of 
these, to influence outcomes like economic growth, savings, inflation, exchange rates with other 
currencies and unemployment. 
 
Interest rate mechanism has truly failed to reflect the real growth of an economy, 
moreover regulation of which has an adverse affect on inflation, employment, exchange rate, 
savings and investment. The last global financial crisis was the vivid example of colossal failure 
of interest based economic system, where we observed frictional reserve system, soaring low 
quality debt financing, which was the consequence of low interest rate, and numb speculation 
lead to the subprime mortgage collapse in the US and which ultimately has affected the global 
financial markets. As evidence shows this is not the last time of course, in the last 100 years 
global financial markets have faced several financial crisis which were directly or indirectly due 
to the failure of interest rate mechanism. In this paper an attempt has been made to provide an 
overview of Islamic monetary policy framework, argue why interest rate can’t be an ideal 
instrument of monetary policy and benchmark for financial and capital market, and propose an 
alternative benchmark rate, which will be determined realistically, true reflection of real 
economic growth by full employment, low or stable inflation, stable currency, high savings and 
investment opportunities, moreover, based on the real sector. 
 
Literature review  
 
Islamic monetary policy literature has been growing rapidly since the end of the last 
century with the rapid development of Islamic finance especially Islamic banks have emerged as 
formidable competitors for conventional interest base banking system. As interest is prohibited 
in Islam, scholars in Islamic economics have been relentlessly working on to find an appropriate 
alternative benchmark which will be a realistic replacement and also fall under the compliance of 
Shariah.  
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Ariff (1982) conducted some preliminary observations on the working of monetary 
policy in an interest-based economy and the possibilities in an interest-free economy. The three 
main goals of monetary policy for an Islamic economic system: a) Economic well being with full 
employment and optimum rate of economic growth; b) Socioeconomic justice and equitable 
distribution of income and wealth and c) Stability in the value of money (Chapra, 1985). 
 
A 25% of demand deposits with the banks for advancing interest-free loan to government 
was proposed by Chapra. To comply with the Islamic monetary policy he further emphasized the 
need fulfillment, optimum growth, full employment, equitable distribution and economic 
stability and proposed to include such monetary instruments as statutory reserve requirements, 
credit ceilings (in particular, goal-oriented allocation of credit), equity-based instruments, 
changes in profit-and-loss sharing ratio and moral suasion (Chapra, 1985; Chapra, 1996). 
 
Khan and Mirakhor (1987) gave a flow-of-funds matrix for an Islamic economy in which 
the central bank provided equity-based support to banks. However, their analytical model rested 
on the conventional interest rate variable relabeled as an a priori variable rate of return. It is, 
therefore, not surprising that they did not find any difference in the effect of monetary policy in 
an Islamic versus a traditional one economy. Khan and Mirakhor (1994) highlighted the 
importance of mudaraba mode deposit mobilization, and list financing instruments that might be 
available in the Islamic financial system. They point out that apart from the Islamic banking 
system there would also be primary, secondary and money markets. There is a great semblance 
between their thinking and what is available in conventional economics. Of course, the 
instruments like mudaraba and musharaka certificates are expected to have Shari‘ah legitimacy. 
Moreover, they regard macroeconomic stability, characterized by price stability and viable 
balance of payments position as the chief goals for monetary policy. As for monetary policy, 
their conclusion is as follows: Monetary policy of an Islamic state takes place in a framework in 
which all conventional tools normally available in a modern economy are at the disposal of the 
monetary authorities with the exception of the discount rate and other policy tools that involve 
interest rate. All other tools, namely open market operations (where equity shares rather than 
bonds are traded) and credit policies, can be as effective in an Islamic system as they are in the 
conventional Western system. Additionally, the authorities in an Islamic system can utilize 
reserve requirements and profit-sharing ratios to achieve changes in the stocks of money and 
credit (Khan and Mirakhor, 1994). 
 
Choudhry and Mirakhor (1997) also focused on the tools for monetary policy. Their main 
proposal is use of equity-based government securities with rates of returns based on budgetary 
surplus for the purpose of monetary management. A good deal has been written on goals of 
Islamic monetary policy and conventional instruments suitability for Islamic economic system 
and unique Islamic monetary instruments have also been proposed since the developments in the 
Islamic finance from the late-1990s and onward.  
 
Analytical framework of the model 
The rationale behind suggesting GDP growth rate as an alternative benchmark 
 
The recent financial crisis has proven that interest rate, which is determined in the money 
market, is the ultimate instrument of monetary policy regulation has failed to control the 
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economic system not only in the east but also in the west. In this circumstance, we need to look 
for an alternative approach to run and control monetary policy in a sustainable way and rate of 
interest which is fixed without considering real sector and real economy cannot solve the 
problem of high inflation, unemployment, low income and savings, investment, and slow growth 
of a real economy. Therefore, in this paper an argument has been made to replace interest rate 
with GDP growth rate as a benchmark instrument for monetary policy based on the following 
works as it can be assumed that it would better reflect the overall performance of an economy 
and ensure greater welfare of the population.   
 
An alternative to money management was presented by Zangeneh and Ahmad (1993) 
presented. They recommended that the central bank could charge the borrowing bank a weighted 
average rate of return in different sectors of the economy. However, this will create problems 
with reference to choice of sectors to calculate the weighted average rate of return. A particular 
bank may not have any investment in certain sector or sectors. Furthermore, this suggestion does 
not solve all the problems pertaining to pricing of products in Islamic finance.  
 
Shaikh (2010) mentioned that Usmani (2003) proposed issuance of GDP growth linked 
instruments to finance public debt. Secondary market can be made for it by directing banks to 
meet their statutory requirements by way of trading in these instruments. This will deepen money 
market and the rate at which this instrument will be traded can be taken as the benchmark for 
pricing and structuring other products. Since the source of funds and use of funds both use the 
same benchmark as in the current system, adopting an alternative benchmark on the source of 
funds side can be used in pricing commercial banking products on the use of funds side. 
 
Khan (2004) argued against elimination of interest by a legal decree and favored free 
market forces to bring the interest rates down to zero. He further stressed on providing incentives 
for the use of equity over debt financing. He proposed following policy measures: i) reducing 
reserve requirements to increase supply of loanable funds; ii) enforcing unlimited liability; iii) 
gradual decline in interest to make investments in debt based instruments less lucrative and shift 
loanable funds towards equity based instruments; iv) allowing dividend as a tax deductible 
expense; and v) providing fiscal incentives to non-leveraged firms and disincentives to leveraged 
firms. 
 
Hanif and Shaikh (2010) recommended the use of a nominal gross domestic product 
growth rate (NGDPGR) as a benchmark rate. They argued that the appeal in the use of NGDPGR 
is that not only can it be used as a base rate for the banking sector but also for central banks as 
their monetary policy tools that encompass both the conventional and Islamic financial systems. 
In their analysis using data from various countries, they showed that there is no statistical 
differences between NGDPGR and various benchmark rates (for example, discount rate, treasury 
bill rate, deposit rate) used in those countries under their study. Therefore, this instrument can be 
used for indexing financing for public exchequer and could also be a major investment 
alternative for money market players as well as an alternate to OMO. 
 
By analyzing the literature and different Islamic monetary policy models, it can be argued 
that the aims of Islamic monetary policy and conventional monetary policy are quite similar even 
though in the Islamic economic system justice and equitable social welfare get priority and no 
existence of ‘Riba’ i.e., Interest rate makes the Islamic system unique. There are many tools 
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available in the conventional monetary policy which can easily be replicated in Islamic monetary 
policy with the exception of the discount rate and other policy tools that involve interest rate. 
Inflation, exchange rate, unemployment, gross savings and investment are variables frequently 
mentioned in the literature as the best indicators of effective monetary policy outcome both in 
the conventional and Islamic. Therefore, an attempt has been made to develop two models to 
compare and see whether real interest rate or GDP growth rate can better reflect and predict the 
monetary policy outcome. 
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Data (Appendix 5) used in this study is from the secondary source, World Bank and IMF 
database. A number of standardized Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions have been 
conducted to determine the impact of the independent variables on Real Interest Rate and GDP 
growth rate by using cross sectional data of 99 countries (Appendix 4) for 2012. In addition to 
that, for both dependant variables six different regressions have been run to identify model 
misspecification, detect the multicollinearity, identification of unnecessary variables and 
explaining power of the independent variables (Table 2 and 3 are presented in the Appendix 2). 
Also, descriptive statistics and correlation matrix (Table 4 and 5 Appendix 2) results are 
presented. Moreover, the following diagnostics tests are conducted: Jarque-Bera test for 
normality, Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey and Breusch-Godfrey Serial 
Correlation LM Test have been carried by using E-views 7. 
 
Model Specifications (An OLS estimation) 
 
Model:1  
RIR = β0 + β1 INF + β2 LOGRXR + β3LOGGS+ β4 UNE +β5 OIC+ β6 OIC.UNE+ β7 OIC.INF+ ε 
Model:2 
GDP = β0 + β1 INF + β2LOGRXR + β3LOGGS+ β4 UNE + β5OIC+ β6 OIC.UNE+ β7 OIC.INF+ ε 
 
RIR  Real Interest Rate (%) 
GDP  GDP growth rate (%) 
INF  Inflation, consumer price (%) 
LOGRXR Log of Real Effective Exchange Rate (%) 
LOGGS Log of Gross savings percentage of GDP (%) 
UNE  Unemployment rate (%) 
OIC  Organization of Islamic Conference Countries 
β0   Intercept  
β1 – β7   Coefficient of the independent variables 
ε   Error term 
 
It is hypothesized that inflation, exchange rate, unemployment, and gross savings are 
highly correlated with the real interest rate and GDP growth rate. Furthermore, all independent 
variables together could better explain the GDP growth rate model than the real interest rate one. 
By adding OIC dummy and two other interactive dummies, it is also hypothesized that there are 
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statistically significant difference on the impact of unemployment and inflation between 
countries in OIC and non-OIC. Brief definitions of the variables are given in the Appendix 1.  
 
Analysis and interpretation of the results 
Table 1: OLS estimation output 
 
                      Variable RIR GDP 
 
Intercept -64.711* 
(26.834) 
-12.596 
(23.814) 
INF 0.275 
(0.217) 
0.419* 
(0.134) 
LOGRXR 14.681* 
(5.759) 
2.426 
(5.154) 
LOGGS -0.138 
(0.797) 
1.072 
(0.580) 
UNE 0.155 
(0.082) 
-0.153* 
(0.076) 
OIC 3.071 
(2.026) 
3.561* 
(1.722) 
OIC*UNE -0.096 
(0.159) 
0.105 
(0.125) 
OIC*INF -0.535 
(0.295) 
-0.498* 
(0.193) 
R2 0.117 0.338 
Adjusted R2 0.047 0.285 
F-Value 1.668 6.405 
Probability 0.127 0.000 
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses. * denotes statistical significance at the 5%  
 
In the first regression of the Table 1, where inflation, exchange rate, gross savings, 
unemployment rate, OIC dummy and two interactive dummies were regressed on real interest 
rate. Real exchange rate has positive relationship with real interest rate at 5% significance level. 
In addition to that there is no significance difference in other independent variables. 
 
In the second regression, all the independent variables are regressed on GDP growth rate. 
In this regression four statistically significant differences are observed. Inflation, 
Unemployment, OIC dummy and OIC.INF interactive dummy show statistically significant 
relationship with GDP growth rate at 5% significance level.  
In the first regression the R2 is 0.117 and adjusted R2 is 0.047 which indicates all 
independent variables together could explain only 11.7% of change in GDP growth rate, which is 
not statistically significant as P-value is 0.127. On the other hand, in the second regression, R2 is 
.338 and adjusted R2 is 0.285 which means all independent variables together could explain 
33.8% of change in GDP growth rate, which is statistically significant as P-value is 0.000. In 
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robustness test, both regressions were run through Jargue Bera normality test, Breusch-Pagan-
Godfrey heteroskedasticity test and Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM test. The result show 
that the first model does not suffer with normality problem, heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation problem. On the other hand, second model doesn’t suffer with normality problem 
and autocorrelation problem but has heteroskedasticity problem as it is a cross-sectional study. 
As a result for the second model the Newy-West method is used to resolve the problem. 
Appendix 3 presents the diagnostic tests conducted for both the models. 
 
Discussion of results 
 
Results of the OLS estimation in the table 1 (RIR column) indicates that one percent 
increase in exchange rate would lead to 14.68% increase in real interest rate. It seems too high; 
this might be due to the nature of the regression and kind of relationship between independent 
variables even though the number of observation was 99.  On the other hand, the second model 
(GDP column) indicates that inflation rate has statistically significant positive correlation with 
GDP growth rate. 1 percent increase inflation would lead to increase in 0.419% increase in GDP 
growth rate. As low and moderate inflation can help the economy grow at a stable rate for a 
longer period of time, even though it is necessary to control the inflation, on the contrary, 
increase in interest rate would lead to increase in inflation and decrease in the real purchasing 
power of the people. The following graph shows the GDP growth rate and inflation for sample 
countries in 2012.   
 
Figure 1: GDP vs Inflation of sample countries in 2012  
a) Inflation in OIC countries 
In the second model, OIC.INF interactive dummy has statistically significant correlation with 
the GDP growth rate. It can be explained as 1% increase in inflation, GDP growth rate in OIC 
countries would be -0.498% less than the non-OIC countries. It indicates that OIC countries are 
more vulnerable to inflation than the non-OIC countries. As most of the OIC countries are 
developing and the economy of GCC countries (mostly OIC countries) largely dependent on oil 
windfall, decrease in oil price would lead to skyrocketing inflation. As the oil price has been free 
falling for the last four quarters in this year, this relationship become evident in many oil 
dependent OIC countries where inflation is expected to rise. The following figure shows the 
inflation rate in non-OIC and OIC countries. 
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Figure 2: Inflation rate in non-OIC and OIC countries in 2012 
b) Unemployment  
In the second model, unemployment rate is negatively correlated with GDP growth rate. It 
can be said that 1% increase in unemployment rate would decrease the GDP growth rate by 
0.153% which is statistically significant at 5% significance level. Unemployment is one of the 
most common problems in OIC countries but in the model OIC.UNE interactive dummy doesn’t 
show any significant difference between in unemployment rate in OIC countries and non OIC 
countries. The following figure shows the unemployment rate in non-OIC and OIC countires. 
  
Figure3: Unemployment rate in non-OIC and OIC countries in 2012 
 
c) OIC dummy 
In the model, OIC dummy shows that GDP growth rate in OIC countries are 3.56% higher 
than the non-OIC countries which is statistically significant at % significance level. This can be 
explained as most of the OIC countries are developing countries and usually developing 
countries have higher GDP growth rate compare to developed countries but in non-OIC countries 
there are many developing countries as well. The following figure in the next page better 
illustrates the GDP growth rate for non-OIC and OIC countries in 2012. 
.*$
$
*$
+$
)$
0$
$
   /,***///,+++/,))



	





	
$
*$
+$
)$
0$
$
*$
+$
)$
 /  ,  / , **/ * *,*/ //



	





	
$
$
$
$
*$
*$
/$
/$
 )  ) * *) / /) + +)  ) )













	
$
$
$
$
*$
*$
 + ,  / )  ** * *0 / /+













	
  
Page | 8  
 
   
Figure 4: GDP growth rate in non-OIC vs OIC countries in 2012 
 
The study has analysed the relationship of real interest rate and GDP growth rate with 
inflation, unemployment by taking into account other key macro economic and qualitative 
variables like OIC and interactive dummies. It can be confirmed after comparing the two models 
that key independent variables which indicate the effectiveness of the monetary policy of a 
country are not signficantly related with the real interest rate but most of them are correlated with 
GDP growth rate and many statstically signficant difference have been found in the study.  The 
following figure shows that GDP growth rate and real interest rate for all sample countries have 
indentical movement even though no signficant correlation has been observed. 
 
 
Figure 5: Real Interest Rate vs GDP growth rate of sample countries in 2012 
 
As it has been discussed in Islamic economic system the main objectives of monetary 
policy are: to promote a sustained and balanced economic growth and mobilize resources for 
economic development; to create employment, to control inflation, to maintain stability in the 
value of money so as to avoid excessive periodic fluctuations; to maintain stability in the 
external value of money to promote an equitable distribution of income and wealth. Therefore, it 
can be argued that it is reasonable to use GDP growth rate as the benchmark for monetary policy 
instrument after adjusting for interest income and inflation. It is unlike a bond indexed for 
inflation which is not recommendable as inflation does not always imply growth in production 
especially in stagflation. Moreover, inflation is more subjective and relative a measure to index 
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an instrument with. Moreover, if Indexation for inflation allowed in financial intermediation at 
broad based level, then it is not practicable in the financial system. As interest rate is prohibited 
in Islamic economic system, and all loans linked with inflation, then more the loans taken, more 
will be the credit money generation (assuming fractional reserve system) and more will be the 
inflation (Hanif aand Shaikh, 2010). For example for those who had nothing to do with all this 
who were neither the borrowers nor the lenders, they will be suffering with this inflation and this 
cannot be controlled since there is no interest rate mechanism. So, we also need to think of how 
to control inflation which is in essence a tax, as argued by many economists rather than 
encouraging indexation for inflation and thereby fueling expected inflation.  
 
Potential problems and measures with the proposed model 
 
Shaikh and Hanif (2009) argue that in recession, Real GDP may be negative, but 
Nominal GDP growth rate will be positive. They ask question whether it will not give an undue 
upward bias to the cost of capital when the production to which it is linked with is not increasing 
in recession. They further argue that stagflation and cost push inflation can be better tackled with 
better supply chain management, reducing intermediaries, promoting market competition. 
Scarcity of Capital created by interest can better be managed by using effective fiscal policy such 
as a high wealth tax and inheritance tax (Piketty, 2014) i.e. Zakat (2.5% on wealth, 5% and 10% 
on production) in an Islamic economy. This will boost up production, improve competition and 
remove obstacles giving rise to cost push inflation and increase revenues for the government by 
increasing the tax base. Inflation is most likely to be low in recession and hence GDP growth rate 
won’t be that high. Even if it is high, private sector financiers like banks would give financing 
based on Cash Flows discounted on that GDP growth rate. Therefore, cost would have to be paid 
by the financees who have higher Cash Flows discounted on GDP growth rate.  
 
It could be further argued that by adjusting inflation in the public and corporate finance 
with the benchmark rate, GDP growth rate, which takes into account inflation; As a result the 
government do not need to resort to printing paper money, quantitative easing, to meet the fiscal 
deficit. If necessary changes are made to avoid budget deficits paper money may not need to be 
printed often and seigniorage, profit made by a government by issuing currency, will not be 
presented as a compelling problem. 
 
Conclusions 
 
This study has reviewed the literature on Islamic monetary policy and identified three 
main goals of Islamic monetary policy, which are: a) economic well being with full employment 
and optimum rate of economic growth; b) socioeconomic justice and equitable distribution of 
income and wealth and c) stability in the value of money. A comparative literature review of 
Islamic and conventional monetary policy revealed that there are many monetary policy 
instruments which can be adopted in Islamic monetary policy with or without major 
modifications such as: Legal Reserve Ratio, Credit Rationing, Selective credit control, Issue of 
directive, and Moral suasion. At the same time, Islamic economists and researchers have come 
up with instruments which are unique and Shariah compliant such as: Profit sharing ratio, 
Refinance ratio, Public share of demand deposits, Value oriented allocation of credit, and Qard 
Hasan ratio. The success of Islamic money market operations in Malaysia and other OIC 
countries weighs in favour of those who advocate the development of a sustainable framework 
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for Sharia compliant monetary policy. For the last two decades an increasing number of Islamic 
monetary management tools and policies have been developed by financial institutions and 
markets in Malaysia and other Muslim countries around the world but still LIBOR is the ultimate 
benchmark in the money and capital market. As many economists argue after such a long time of 
great moderation, a reduction in the volatility of business cycle fluctuations starting in the mid-
1980s, believed to have been caused by institutional and structural changes in developed nations 
in the later part of the twentieth century, the recent global financial crisis has proven to us that 
interest rate which is the definitive instrument of monetary policy regulation has not only failed 
to control the economic system but also has created inequality, social injustice and rampant 
corruption and manipulation by global financial institutions supported by the government 
officials (Mirakhor, 2014). For example, during the recession, the USA and many European 
countries have intentionally violated the so called market principles and intervened 
overwhelmingly to protect many giant financial institutions. This study found that real interest 
rate is not a viable instrument for monetary policy framework as no significant relationship has 
been found with key factors such as inflation and unemployment. On the other hand, GDP 
growth rate has a statistically significant relationship with inflation and unemployment, GDP 
growth rate is higher for OIC countries, although unemployment rate is higher.  In this context, it 
is the order of the day to look for a realistic and sustainable alternative of Interest rate, which is 
abhorrently prohibited in Islamic economic system. As a result, we need to look for an 
alternative approach to run and control monetary policy in a sustainable way and rate of interest, 
which is fixed without considering real sector and real economy cannot solve the problem of 
high inflation, savings, income, investment, and growth of an economy. Therefore, it can be 
argued to replace interest rate with GDP growth rate linked instrument which could provide a 
benchmark rate for pricing products in Islamic commercial banking and provide an avenue for 
investment in the Islamic money market and capital market for example GDP growth linked 
Sukuk (Bacha and Mirakhor, 2013). The GDP growth linked benchmark can also be used to 
benchmark not only domestic debt but also foreign debt. Central Bank in an interest free 
economic framework will continue to have statutory reserve ratio to contain money supply and 
control credit creation. Furthermore, introducing GDP linked instruments would provide a base 
instrument for OMO and create a secondary market for the instrument. Using Refinance ratio, 
Qard-e-Hassan Ratio Issue of directive, and Moral suasion the central bank will be able to 
manage liquidity in the banking sector. It can be concluded that due to its limited and focused 
scope the study could not take into account other macro economic variables that may affect real 
interest rate and GDP growth rate, panel data might provide better estimation, therefore, further 
research is required in this area specially by taking panel data in order to see the relationship and 
consistency across countries, region and economy. 
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Appendix 1 
Variables explained 
 
Real interest rate: Real interest rate is the lending interest rate adjusted for inflation as measured by the GDP 
deflator. 
Real effective exchange rate index (2010 = 100): Real effective exchange rate is the nominal effective exchange 
rate (a measure of the value of a currency against a weighted average of several foreign currencies) divided by a 
price deflator or index of costs. 
GDP growth (annual %): Annual percentage growth rate of GDP at market prices based on constant local 
currency. Aggregates are based on constant 2005 U.S. dollars. GDP is the sum of gross value added by all resident 
producers in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products. 
It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of 
natural resources. 
Gross savings (% of GDP): Gross savings are calculated as gross national income less total consumption, plus net 
transfers. 
Inflation, consumer prices (annual %): Inflation as measured by the consumer price index reflects the annual 
percentage change in the cost to the average consumer of acquiring a basket of goods and services that may be fixed 
or changed at specified intervals, such as yearly. The Laspeyres formula is generally used. 
Unemployment, total (% of total labor force) (modeled ILO estimate): Unemployment refers to the share of the 
labor force that is without work but available for and seeking employment. 
OIC: 34 countries from the Organization of Islamic Conference Countries. 
 
Appendix 2 
Table 2 Dependent variable: RIR (6-regressions) 
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwith = 4.0000) 
Variables 1 2 (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 4.861* 
(0.784) 
-44.931 
(32.887) 
-44.611 
(33.154) 
-64.965* 
(32.491) 
-65.206 
(32.915) 
-64.711 
(26.834) 
INF 
0.091 
(0.158) 
0.047 
(0.166) 
0.001 
(0.174) 
-0.002 
(0.166) 
-0.004 
(0.171) 
0.275 
(0.217) 
LOGRXR  
10.796 
(7.179) 
10.979 
(7.203) 
14.993 
(7.052) 
15.040 
(7.134) 
14.681* 
(5.759) 
LOGGS   
-0.343 
(0.765) 
-0.139 
(0.755) 
-0.138 
(0.763) 
-0.138 
(0.797) 
UNE    
0.138* 
(0.070) 
0.139 
(0.070) 
0.155 
(0.082) 
OIC     
0.071 
(0.812) 
3.071 
(2.026) 
OIC*UNE      
-0.096 
(0.159) 
OIC*INF      
-0.535 
(0.295) 
R2 0.004 0.046 0.044 0.081 0.081 0.117 
Adjusted R2 -0.005 0.026 0.013 0.040 0.030 0.047 
F-Value 0.423 2.319 1.427 2.012 1.594 1.668 
Probability 0.517 0.104 0.240 0.099 0.170 0.127 
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses. * and **denotes statistical significance at the 10%, 
5% and 1% levels respectively. 
   
 
Table 3 Dependent variable: GDP (6-regressions) 
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HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwith = 4.0000) 
Variables 1 2 (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Intercept 1.946* 
(0.660) 
-30.846 
(18.110) 
-27.247 
(20.339) 
-7.428 
(20.683) 
-15.665 
(22.875) 
-12.596 
(23.814) 
INF 
0.214 
(0.107) 
0.185 
(0.109) 
0.213 
(0.111) 
0.221* 
(0.106) 
0.147 
(0.125) 
0.419** 
(0.134) 
LOGRXR  
7.109 
(3.906) 
5.525 
(4.476) 
1.616 
(4.438) 
3.232 
(5.003) 
2.426 
(5.154) 
LOGGS   
1.247* 
(0.620) 
1.048 
(0.660) 
1.091 
(0.611) 
1.072 
(0.580) 
UNE    
-0.135* 
(0.067) 
-0.121 
(0.061) 
-0.153* 
(0.076) 
OIC     
2.423* 
(0.624) 
3.561* 
(1.722) 
OIC*UNE      
0.105 
(0.125) 
OIC*INF      
-0.498* 
(0.193) 
R2 0.035 0.062 0.101 0.154 0.286 0.338 
Adjusted R2 0.026 0.043 0.071 0.117 0.246 0.285 
F-Value 3.567 3.186 3.439 4.149 7.203 6.405 
Probability 0.062 0.045 0.020 0.003 0.000 0.000 
Notes: Standard errors are in the parentheses. *, **, and denotes statistical significance at the 
10% and 5% levels respectively. 
Table 4 
Descriptive statistics 
 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Skewness Kurtosis 
RIR 5.228 4.307 16.797 -2.400 3.808 0.778 3.659 
GDP 2.809 2.896 10.828 -6.973 3.131 -0.022 3.200 
INF 4.028 3.316 14.016 -0.667 2.751 1.244 4.714 
LOGRXR 4.629 4.611 4.888 4.459 0.073 0.956 4.505 
LOGGS 2.997 3.037 3.932 1.518 0.491 -0.418 3.141 
UNE 8.625 7.400 31.000 0.700 5.725 1.772 6.286 
 
 
Table 5 
r-Pearson Correlation matrix  
 
RIR GDP INF LOGRXR LOGGS UNE 
RIR 1.000 
GDP 0.124 1.000 
INF 0.035 0.199 1.000 
LOGRXR 0.206* 0.179 0.143 1.000 
LOGGS -0.021 0.210* -0.009 0.110 1.000 
UNE 0.104 -0.298** -0.024 -0.378** -0.165 1.000 
 
Notes: * and **. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 and 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
Appendix 3 
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Diagnostic tests (First Model) 
Dependent Variable: RIR   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 99    
Included observations: 96   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -64.71117 26.83408 -2.411530 0.0180 
INF 0.274968 0.216563 1.269692 0.2075 
LOGRXR 14.68114 5.759473 2.549042 0.0125 
LOGGS -0.138063 0.797080 -0.173210 0.8629 
UNE 0.154990 0.081913 1.892119 0.0618 
OIC 3.071148 2.025547 1.516206 0.1331 
OIC*UNE -0.095731 0.159027 -0.601981 0.5487 
OIC*INF -0.534756 0.295216 -1.811405 0.0735 
     
     R-squared 0.117113    Mean dependent var 5.213762 
Adjusted R-squared 0.046883    S.D. dependent var 3.844629 
S.E. of regression 3.753424    Akaike info criterion 5.562869 
Sum squared resid 1239.761    Schwarz criterion 5.776565 
Log likelihood -259.0177    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.649249 
F-statistic 1.667565    Durbin-Watson stat 1.632716 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.127404    
     
     
 
Normality test:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
-8 -6 -4 -2 0 2 4 6 8 10
Series: Residuals
Sample 1 99
Observations 96
Mean       1.49e-15
Median  -0.908494
Maximum  10.65940
Minimum -8.774026
Std. Dev.   3.612494
Skewness   0.512944
Kurtosis   3.300624
Jarque-Bera  4.571287
Probability  0.101709
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     F-statistic 0.900930    Prob. F(7,88) 0.5096 
Obs*R-squared 6.419760    Prob. Chi-Square(7) 0.4917 
Scaled explained SS 6.205222    Prob. Chi-Square(7) 0.5160 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 99    
Included observations: 96   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -299.9429 141.2906 -2.122879 0.0366 
INF 0.097032 1.140277 0.085095 0.9324 
LOGRXR 68.30425 30.32560 2.252363 0.0268 
LOGGS -2.849882 4.196898 -0.679045 0.4989 
UNE 0.469502 0.431302 1.088570 0.2793 
OIC 6.658343 10.66520 0.624305 0.5340 
OIC*UNE -0.040805 0.837334 -0.048732 0.9612 
OIC*INF -0.889575 1.554413 -0.572290 0.5686 
     
     R-squared 0.066872    Mean dependent var 12.91417 
Adjusted R-squared -0.007354    S.D. dependent var 19.69080 
S.E. of regression 19.76306    Akaike info criterion 8.885162 
Sum squared resid 34370.93    Schwarz criterion 9.098858 
Log likelihood -418.4878    Hannan-Quinn criter. 8.971541 
F-statistic 0.900930    Durbin-Watson stat 1.825660 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.509582    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
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F-statistic 1.174327    Prob. F(2,86) 0.3139 
Obs*R-squared 2.552057    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.2791 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 99    
Included observations: 96   
Presample and interior missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -0.193710 26.82796 -0.007220 0.9943 
INF -0.053279 0.220627 -0.241488 0.8098 
LOGRXR 0.039570 5.755084 0.006876 0.9945 
LOGGS 0.012019 0.797098 0.015078 0.9880 
UNE 0.016110 0.083191 0.193654 0.8469 
OIC 0.003716 2.021715 0.001838 0.9985 
OIC*UNE -0.029685 0.161657 -0.183631 0.8547 
OIC*INF 0.070178 0.300645 0.233424 0.8160 
RESID(-1) 0.140993 0.117140 1.203627 0.2320 
RESID(-2) -0.022787 0.111358 -0.204630 0.8383 
     
     R-squared 0.026584    Mean dependent var 1.49E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.075285    S.D. dependent var 3.612494 
S.E. of regression 3.746010    Akaike info criterion 5.577592 
Sum squared resid 1206.803    Schwarz criterion 5.844712 
Log likelihood -257.7244    Hannan-Quinn criter. 5.685566 
F-statistic 0.260962    Durbin-Watson stat 1.847072 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.983200    
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Diagnostic test (Second Model) 
 
Dependent Variable: GDP   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 99    
Included observations: 96   
HAC standard errors & covariance (Bartlett kernel, Newey-West fixed bandwidth 
= 4.0000) 
   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -12.59562 23.81437 -0.528908 0.5982 
INF 0.418863 0.134268 3.119613 0.0024 
LOGRXR 2.425610 5.153723 0.470652 0.6391 
LOGGS 1.071726 0.579609 1.849049 0.0678 
UNE -0.152839 0.075761 -2.017390 0.0467 
OIC 3.561666 1.722014 2.068314 0.0415 
OIC*UNE 0.104953 0.124649 0.841982 0.4021 
OIC*INF -0.498114 0.192673 -2.585281 0.0114 
     
     R-squared 0.337541    Mean dependent var 2.917177 
Adjusted R-squared 0.284845    S.D. dependent var 3.108922 
S.E. of regression 2.629117    Akaike info criterion 4.850829 
Sum squared resid 608.2786    Schwarz criterion 5.064524 
Log likelihood -224.8398    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.937208 
F-statistic 6.405479    Durbin-Watson stat 1.673542 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.000004    
     
     
 
Normality test: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Series: Residuals
Sample 1 99
Observations 96
Mean       3.13e-15
Median  -0.267515
Maximum  5.960507
Minimum -4.929859
Std. Dev.   2.530402
Skewness   0.325182
Kurtosis   2.687726
Jarque-Bera  2.081957
Probability  0.353109
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Heteroskedasticity Test: Breusch-Pagan-Godfrey 
     
     F-statistic 2.466635    Prob. F(7,88) 0.0233 
Obs*R-squared 15.74651    Prob. Chi-Square(7) 0.0275 
Scaled explained SS 11.16552    Prob. Chi-Square(7) 0.1316 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID^2   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 99    
Included observations: 96   
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C -90.53092 56.19944 -1.610887 0.1108 
INF 0.395772 0.453554 0.872602 0.3853 
LOGRXR 20.69787 12.06224 1.715922 0.0897 
LOGGS -1.367913 1.669349 -0.819429 0.4148 
UNE 0.394461 0.171554 2.299343 0.0239 
OIC 14.04808 4.242167 3.311534 0.0013 
OIC*UNE -0.749467 0.333056 -2.250273 0.0269 
OIC*INF -1.589517 0.618280 -2.570870 0.0118 
     
     R-squared 0.164026    Mean dependent var 6.336235 
Adjusted R-squared 0.097528    S.D. dependent var 8.274774 
S.E. of regression 7.860912    Akaike info criterion 7.041338 
Sum squared resid 5437.867    Schwarz criterion 7.255033 
Log likelihood -329.9842    Hannan-Quinn criter. 7.127717 
F-statistic 2.466635    Durbin-Watson stat 2.014218 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.023322    
     
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Breusch-Godfrey Serial Correlation LM Test:  
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F-statistic 0.716312    Prob. F(2,86) 0.4914 
Obs*R-squared 1.573004    Prob. Chi-Square(2) 0.4554 
     
     
     
Test Equation:    
Dependent Variable: RESID   
Method: Least Squares   
Sample: 1 99    
Included observations: 96   
Presample and interior missing value lagged residuals set to zero. 
     
     Variable Coefficient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.   
     
     C 0.380873 18.95512 0.020093 0.9840 
INF -0.018022 0.153762 -0.117209 0.9070 
LOGRXR 0.012626 4.064891 0.003106 0.9975 
LOGGS -0.123100 0.567400 -0.216955 0.8288 
UNE 0.002067 0.058010 0.035625 0.9717 
OIC -0.121109 1.471649 -0.082295 0.9346 
OIC*UNE -0.002141 0.114630 -0.018679 0.9851 
OIC*INF 0.011433 0.210419 0.054333 0.9568 
RESID(-1) 0.141356 0.116604 1.212272 0.2287 
RESID(-2) -0.081798 0.114117 -0.716792 0.4754 
     
     R-squared 0.016385    Mean dependent var 3.13E-15 
Adjusted R-squared -0.086551    S.D. dependent var 2.530402 
S.E. of regression 2.637634    Akaike info criterion 4.875974 
Sum squared resid 598.3117    Schwarz criterion 5.143094 
Log likelihood -224.0468    Hannan-Quinn criter. 4.983948 
F-statistic 0.159180    Durbin-Watson stat 1.932155 
Prob(F-statistic) 0.997307    
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Appendix 5 
 
Table 7: Data: Unemployment rate, Real exchange rate, Real interest rate, GDP growth rate, 
Gross savings for 99 countries in the year 2012 
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